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The WHO declared the coronavirus COVID-19 outbreak a public health emergency of 
international concern on January 30, 2020. Since the first COVID-19 case on November 17, 
2019 (according to unpublished government data), the number of cumulative cases worldwide 
has been around 9.76 million and more than 492 K had died from the disease as of June 27, 2020. 
A huge amount of data have been and are being collected during the pandemic, and will be 
in the future. The data, coupled with state-of-art computing and analysis techniques, play a 
powerful role in the efforts of harnessing the spread of COVID-19. On the other hand, the 
collected data, such as health data and medical history, contact tracing, and social control, often 
contain personally identifiable information and pose high risk for compromised privacy. The EU 
Parliament states in a press release that “These tools could seriously interfere with people’s 
fundamental rights to a private life and the protection of personal data, and are tantamount to a 
state of surveillance of individuals”. How to balance private protection vs personal data 
collection and release for monitoring the pandemic and improving public health has attracted 
much research interest and will be a subject of continuing debate. Government, academia, and 
industry have already worked together to search for effective solutions to this problem. 
A variety of types of information collected during the COVID-19 pandemic are associated 
with privacy concerns. Here, we focus on the privacy issues incurred by contact. 
Contact Tracing in COVID-19 Pandemic 
Contact tracing is to use digital tools to trace and monitor contacts of infected people during 
an epidemic, so to alert and inform people who have come into contact with interacted people, 
and help to ensure effective quarantine of contacts to prevent additional transmission. Contact 
tracing is widely adopted and is key to prevent the further spread of COVID-19 in many regions 
and countries.  Figure 1 was used by Washington Governor Jay Inslee when announcing the 
state's contact tracing plan and shows a nice summary on how contact is used and can do. 
 
1 To appear in CHANCE 33(3): Special Issue on Covid-19. 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Many countries and regions have the ability to conduct manual contact tracing; however, it 
is difficult to scale up manual tracing to respond to the unpreceded COVID-19 pandemic, not to 
mention the resources spent on training human contact tracers and that the tracing process is 
prone to time-consuming and error-prone. To help (semi-)automatize the contact tracing and 
notification efforts, countries and regions have developed and deployed or are considering 
adopting contact-tracing software or mobile apps. While contact tracing apps and software are 
playing an important role in tracking and slowing down the spread of COVID-19, red flags have 
been raised regarding the high privacy risk associated with contact tracing in the media such as 
Washington Post, Forbes, and Reuters, as well as organizations and government agencies. For 
example, contact tracing based on location data often collects very detailed and frequent location 
data, which are known to be highly revealing of people's identity and can be used to infer of the 
private social life and health status of the individuals (De Montjoye et. al. in 2013 published a 
study of 1.5 million individuals over a period of 15 months found that four spatial-temporal 
mobility data points are enough to identify 95% of the individuals).  
Table 1 provides some examples on the contact tracing apps and software in some countries 
that categorized by the technology used and the degree to which authorities are involved during 
data collection and information sharing. GPS-based contact-tracing apps and software collect 
users' location data, whereas the Bluetooth based techniques mostly only require the relative 
tempo-spatial proximity among users. In that sense, less private information is collected in the 
Bluetooth-based approaches than in the GPS-based approaches. In both the GPS and the 
Bluetooth-based approaches, the centralized or non-centralized models can be deployed to 
collect and store data, share information, and alert users regarding potential COVID-19 exposure. 
However, the two models differ in the levels of anonymity and in the approaches to achieve 
privacy protection for the data contributors. For the centralized model, contact tracing data are 
collected, integrated, shared with targeted individuals by some authorities (e.g health authorities 
or federal, state or local governments). Therefore, the centralized model somewhat operates like 
a mass surveillance system and data are collected from everyone, whether healthy or diseased, 
and the authorities have the unique identifiers on all the individuals and know whom to target 
with certain information. In terms of privacy, there is no privacy for the users in terms  
Figure 1: Contact Tracing (courtesy of Washington Governor Office) 
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Table 1: Examples of COVID-19 Contact Tracing Apps and Software 
 
information sharing with the health authorities and they will just have to trust the authorities to 
keep their data safe and private. In contrast, for the decentralized model, there is no need to 
collect or store information on everyone through a central server. Location and contact 
information of those who are not tested or tested negative are stored and processed locally on 
their respective devices, and they can choose to check whether they have crossed path with 
infected people through public platforms like a website the contains COVID-19 hot spots 
information built by authorities or receive notification by locally information matching. In the 
former case, the information shared on the public website has already gone through some types 
of data anonymization, blurring, and redaction through careful planning or integrating formal 
privacy concepts. In summary, the decentralized model offers a higher level of privacy protection 
on individuals compared to the centralized models. Table 1 also suggest the centralized model is 
mainly employed by Asian countries, whereas the decentralized model is preferred by the US 
and European countries. In what follows, we will look into how the centralized and decentralized 
models work in the GPS and Bluetooth based technology, respectively, in more details. 
GPS-based Contact-Tracing Scheme 
GPS-based apps collect time-stamped GPS points 24/7 from individuals. If the collected GPS 
data suggest that two people were in close proximity to each other at a certain time, and if one 
of them was tested positive for COVID-19 later on, then the other person will either receive 
notifications from authorities regarding the contact event or find out this information by locally 
checking publicly posted contact tracing information from the health authorities themselves. The 
    
technology 
GPS Bluetooth GPS+Bluetooth 
 
 
 
 
data 
collection 
and 
information 
sharing 
model 
centralized Alipay Health Code 
(China); WeChat 
(China) ; Corona 100m 
(South Korea); 
CovidTracker 
(Thailand); ProteGo 
(Poland) 
Tracetogether 
(Singapore) 
Aarogya Setu 
(India)  
decentralized safe paths (US) 
HaMagen (Israeli) 
Pan-European Privacy-
Preserving Proximity 
Tracing (PEPP-PT) (EU); 
COVID watch (Mainly 
US); PACT (US); 
COVIDsafe (Australia) 
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way that the authorities collect and share information leads to either the centralized and de-
centralized models.  
The Alipay Health Code from China is an example of the centralized model. Alipay Health 
Code assigns an individual a color QR code (green, yellow, red), representing the individual's 
health status. A green code indicates the highest of level of healthiness and the individual is 
allowed to go anywhere unrestricted; red stands for high risk and requires a 2-week quarantine, 
and yellow means a 1-week quarantine. The determination of the color code is often based on 
the location history of the individual. If the person has been to a COVID-19 hot spot, then there 
is a non-ignorable chance the person may be infected and is likely to receive a red or yellow 
code. Each time the individual's QR code is scanned, the information regarding the current 
location is sent to some servers belonging to some authorities, allowing the authorities to track 
people’s movements over time. Furthermore, the app often requires users to register with their 
unique identification information such as national identification number, name, and phone 
number. Similar to China, South Korea developed the Corona 100m (Co100) app in the 
framework of the centralized model. The app uses the government collected location data to alert 
users when they come within 100 meters of a location recently visited by a COVID-19 patient.  
Safe Paths is an MIT-led privacy-preserving platform and is an example of the decentralized 
model. It comprises a smartphone app, PrivateKit, and a web application, SafePlaces. SafePlaces 
share anonymized and blurred location histories of infected people whereas PrivateKit allows 
users to match their personal location history with shared information on SafePlaces. In other 
words, healthy individuals keep their own location diaries without having to sharing with or 
reporting to authorities. If an individual is tested positive for COVID-19, her location history 
information, with her consent, will be reported to the authorities. Since the location history 
contains private information and a big part of it is not even relevant for COVID-19 tracing (e.g. 
the home location where the individual spends most of her time), the information is often 
redacted or blurred before placed on SafePlaces, to which users can compare their location 
diaries with those infected to see if they have ever crossed paths. Israel developed the Hamagen 
app (Hamagen is Hebrew for shield) that is based on a similar idea as the Safe Paths platform. It 
allows local comparison of users' GPS data with the government epidemiological location 
database on COVID-19 hot spots. 
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(a) A schematic of GPS-based centralized model  (b) A schematic of GPS-based decentralized model 
Figure 2: GPS-based contact-tracing schemes 
The centralized and decentralized models in the framework of GPS-based contact-tracing are 
depicted in Figure 2. The centralized model tracks location and contact information and health 
status with unique identifiers from both patients and healthy users. The potential privacy risk in 
this scheme is obvious. First, it can be tricky to keep the identity of the infected person 
confidential in some cases when broadcasting her location history, especially if she is one of the 
few persons the healthy people interacted with in close proximity recently. Second, it 
personalizes the alert and notification systems. This level of precision comes at the cost of 
compromised individual privacy. Individuals whose data are collected in the centralized model 
reply on the authorities to keep their data private and safe, but this is not always warranted. In 
contrast, the decentralized model only collects location information and shares an anonymized 
version of that information from reported COVID-19 patients. Therefore, there is a higher level 
of privacy protection for the patients. Furthermore, the decentralized model does not trace 
healthy people and only share the information on COVID-19 hot spots on a public forum with 
no specific targeting at certain individuals or sending un-personalized information to app users. 
Therefore, the privacy concern level is much lower in the decentralized model for healthy people. 
On the other hand, without personalized alerts, the decentralized model would reply on users' 
self-initiation and pro-activity to check whether they might have been to any of the infection hot 
spots recently and self-quarantine if that is the case. 
Formal notions on privacy guarantee can be incorporated in both the centralized and 
decentralized models when developing the GPS-based contract tracing apps and software. For 
example, the 𝑘𝑘 -anonymity model introduced by Sweeney in 2002 can be used to collapse 
detailed location information or quasi-identifiers to yield at ≥ 𝑘𝑘 “homogeneous'' individuals in 
each cell of the cross-tabulation of a set of attributes. Geo-indistinguishability is a formal location 
privacy concept proposed by Andrés et. al. in 2013, extending of the popular differential privacy 
concept by Dwork et. al. in 2006, and can be used to generate sanitized location information. 
Regardless which formal privacy notation is used to sanitize the data before releasing and sharing 
with the public or a targeted group, the accuracy of contact tracing will be more or less affected.  
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Bluetooth-based Contract-Tracing Scheme 
Different with the GPS -based privacy-preserving scheme, the Bluetooth-based contact-tracing 
apps do not collect the exact location information from their users. In that sense, users would 
feel more private and less anxious about being monitored 24/7 on their whereabouts. In addition, 
Bluetooth has higher contact tracing accuracy than GPS-based apps. Bluetooth signals do not 
rebound and pass through most soft walls, helping to avoid the false positive that two people in 
close proximity are regarded as a “contact” event whereas they are actually separated by walls. 
Specifically, the Bluetooth technology is leveraged to collect information on whether or not 
two people have appeared in the same location within 6 feet of each other at the same time. Each 
app user generates a time-varying sequence of random tokens, which are stored locally on their 
devices. The time interval between two tokens cannot be too frequent to cause computational or 
storage difficulty for the users, and nor can be too infrequent to make the tracing ineffective or 
incur privacy concerns. If two users appear within 6 feet of each other at a time 𝑡𝑡, they exchange 
their tokens at that time, which are stored in their contact token sets. If one of them is diagnosed 
with COVID-19, say within 2 weeks after the contact event, then she will, with her consent, 
share her contact token sets from the last 2 weeks with health authorities who will subsequently 
notify people who might have had shared a contact event with the infected person. The way that 
the authorities collect data and notify users about potential exposure leads to either the 
centralized or de-centralized models.  
 
Figure 3: A schematic of Bluetooth-based Centralized Model 
The Singapore's Bluetooth based mobile phone app TraceTogether is an example of the 
centralized approach. In this model (Figure 3), all app users report their tokens (denoted by {𝑎𝑎0,𝑎𝑎1, … } and {𝑏𝑏0, 𝑏𝑏1, … }) as well as their phone numbers to the health authority regardless of 
their health status. If a person is diagnosed with COVID-19, the person updates the authority on 
his health status and shares his contact tokens (denoted by �𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐,0, 𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐,1, … , 𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡, … � ). The 
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authorities then match each token in the contact token set with their database of tokens, and alert 
the users with matches through their phone contacts. 
The privacy risk on the infected individuals regarding their health status associated with the 
alerting and notification system is similar to the centralized model in the GPS-based scheme. 
Similar to the centralized model in the GPS-based system, the users have no choice but just have 
to trust the authorized safe and private. In addition, the authorities have each user' phone number, 
which is a unique identifier and can be used to link to other databases that might contain sensitive 
information on the users if the authorities feel there is a need to do so.  
The Covid Watch, Private Automated Contact Tracing (PACT), and COVIDsafe apps and the 
Pan-European Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing (PEPP-PT) software are examples of the 
decentralized approaches that leverage the Bluetooth technology. The Covid Watch app 
represents an international effort from more than 400 volunteers around the world (US, Canada, 
Australia, etc), and sends anonymous privacy-preserving COVID-19 exposure alerts via private 
and local Bluetooth signal. PACT is developed by MIT, working with partners from around the 
world; not only collect information on binary contact events but also on the distance and time 
duration of a contact event. COVIDsafe is the app used by Australian government for contact 
tracing. PEPP-PT is a larger software system with many individual components and sends alert 
on possible exposures. In the decentralized model (Figure 4), only the tokens of the patient with 
COVID-19, together with his history contact event numbers, are collected by authority, with the 
patient’s consent. The patient receives a permission number from the authority, which is then 
posted in a public database. The public database verifies the permission number and updates 
itself with the contact numbers shared by the patient. Other users can compare their contact event 
numbers with the publicly posted contact event numbers; and if there is a match, they are noticed 
that they may have been exposed to the virus and need self-quarantine. 
 
 
For the Bluetooth-based privacy-preserving contract tracing, anonymity can be enhanced 
by randomly swapping generated random tokens across users to better prevent linkage privacy 
Figure 4: A schematic of Bluetooth-based Decentralized Model 
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attack. There also exist cryptography solutions toward privacy protection, such as the technology 
developed by Apple and Google, using secure multi-party computation without relying on a 
trusted server, or sending anonymous encrypted or random messages, as proposed by Cho et. al, 
Hekmati et. al, and Reichert et al. in March and April of 2020. 
Final Remarks 
In addition to the technology-specific approaches for privacy-preserving contact tracing, some 
general principles for data privacy protection, such as necessity, proportionality, and 
transparency, may also apply in the COVID-19 pandemic data collection and information sharing. 
For example, it is often permissible to share anonymized data or aggregated statistics that are 
associated with low individual re-identification risk. If there exists non-ignorable re-
identification risk or there is a need to reveal individual identity when releasing information, 
there must be a justification for doing so. Minimizing data collection and limiting access and 
retaining data only for the minimum amount of time that is necessary also help to reduce the 
privacy harms due to COVID-19 data processing. Obtaining consents is also commonly used for 
privacy protection. The subjects from whom data are collected and shared should receive clear 
communications from authorities regarding the purposes and usage, and the retention duration 
of their data, among others. Given the unprecedented situation of COVID-19, consents might 
take a different form than the regular consents when it comes to data sharing, especially when 
an individual feels compelled to share her contact and location history once tested positive. 
Privacy is not at odds with the efforts and measures for harnessing COVID-19. On the 
contrary, any measure taken authorities and governments is effective only when its citizens trust 
such a measure. It is pointless to develop a contact-tracing software or app that users don't trust 
or use. The protection of privacy is key to building such trust between the public and the 
authorities in the case of COVID-19 contact tracing. Government and authorities should continue 
to commit to privacy preservation during their push and implementation of COVID-19 contract 
tracing, now and in the future. All parties (the public, authorities, academic, and industry) should 
work together to develop effective policies and technologies to protect the privacy of the people 
when collecting data on COVID-19 to help curb the global pandemic. 
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